The United States Supreme Court agreed to decide a pair of cases[Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs] challenging the constitutionality of life sentences for juveniles convicted in slayings committed when they were 14. The certiori writ claims the sentences of life without parole are cruel and unusual punishment and petitioners seek to expand on the Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Graham v. Florida that held sentences of life in prison without parole are unconstitutional for juveniles who have not been charged with murder.
One of the youths in the new cases accepted by the court, Evan Miller of Alabama, received a life sentence after he and another youth beat a neighbor in 2003 and set fire to his home. The neighbor died of smoke inhalation. In the other case, Kuntrell Jackson of Arkansas was convicted for his part in the robbery and shooting death of a video store clerk in 1999. Jackson has maintained he was the lookout.
Tuesday, November 8, 2011
Monday, November 7, 2011
Kamla Harris Not Joining New York's AJ Eric Schneiderman's Mortgage Fraud Investigation? Why?
An interesting November 7, 2011 article by Matt Stoller [former Senior Policy Advisor to Rep. Alan Grayson and a fellow at the Roosevelt Institute. You can reach him at Stoller@gmail.com or follow him on Twitter at @matthewstoller] called "50 State Settlement Chatter – $65 Million of Fundraising and the Kamala Harris Network" [found at http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/11/matt-stoller-50-state-settlement-chatter-%e2%80%93-65-million-of-fundraising-and-the-kamala-harris-network.html], if true explains much about the lackluster approach to protecting consumers victimized by mortgage fraud in California.
California Attorney General Harris has positioned herself to either be the champion of consumers or the banking lobby. Commentators have either seen her as a progressive rising star or as another democratic hack.
Understanding how Harris thinks about politics matters as it kinda clues one into what she is likely to do next (or not do).
In Matt Stoller's article he comments:
.
"Harris’s decision-making seems to be driven by personal connections and fundraising networks. This is not at all unusual, but it does contrast a bit with other types of public servants, who often see their job as serving the law itself. So what do her personal connections and fundraising networks look like?
.
Well, largely she shares them with President Obama, who endorsed her late in 2010 for the AG office. Her brother-in-law, Tony West, was key fundraiser for Obama in California, having helped raise $65 million for Obama in the state, and he is considered a rising star in the Democratic Party. He now works at the DOJ and has expanded the Civil Rights department to take on some elements of mortgage fraud. The DOJ has an internal directive to make mortgage fraud a top priority, but what mortgage fraud means to the DOJ are mortgage modification scams and penny ante borrowers ripping off fly-by-night lenders. West, while not the direct actor in the DOJ’s settlement talks, is in all likelihood involved in pressure on state AGs to sign on to a settlement. And it’s simply inconceivable he hasn’t dealt with his sister-in-law and political ally on the matter. Harris and West are part of a coherent political network, and much of the strength of that network has to do with reinforcing the traditional bank-friendly policies of the Democratic elite and then using that to create political support.
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The first indication that as California AG Harris was more sympathetic to the Obama side of the ledger on banking is that one of her first decisions as AG was to let off Angelo Mozilo without admitting to wrong-doing or personally paying a fine (the small money that went to restitution came from Bank of America shareholders). I suspect the issue is actually more personal to her than legal, not because she particularly cares about finance or foreclosures, but because her friends and allies are very concerned about ensuring that the banks get a release. In their view, this will cause the housing market to clear, the economy to recover, and then help reelection chances".
.
While General Harris' supporters point out that she backed out of an immediate settlement a few weeks ago with the banks that screwed millions of Californians, she refused to join the joint investigation by Eric Schneiderman and Beau Biden on the foreclosure fraud crisis. The question has to be WHY?
.
Is she afraid of sharing visibility on the subject? Is she worried she will look inadequate in leading her budget ravaged staff that historically is more pro-institution than pro-consumer? Or is she just on the sidelines, trying to figure out what to do? Or is she more closely aligned to the very banking execs she should be joining in the investigation of [For example, she let the mortgage mauraders at Countrywide and its CEO Angelo Mozilo off the hook in February of 2011 when he paid a mere $6.5 million to get out of a predatory lending lawsuit filed by the state of California].
.
What is clear is that Kamala Harris is no progressive lie New York's AJ Eric Schneiderman.
.
The Kamala Harris history?
.
Harris got her start in big time San Francisco politics she was best known as the ex-girlfriend of former long-time Speaker of the California Assembly Willie Brown, who remains a powerful figure in California politics. Harris dumped Brown shortly after he became mayor but he provided key help to her campaign for District Attorney in 2003. It was a tough race against a two-term incumbent. In that race she agreed to participate in a system that mandated campaign finance limits. In the last days of the race when it was clear she had a shot at winning, she ignored the mandated spending limits she had previously agreed to assuming that the fines would be well worth the expense of spending extra money in the home stretch if she won. And she did win. Her career as San Francisco’s District Attorney was marred by allegations of massive mismanagement of the city’s crime lab which was under her jurisdiction. As a result, allegedly hundreds of criminal cases had to be thrown out of court.
.
Maybe General Harris could learn from a very tough AG in hard hit Nevada, Catherine Cortez Masto.
.
Window dressing politics have to stop. Harris needs to decide if she wants to be a warrior for victims or an apologist for the banking smucks that are still raking us over the coals.
California Attorney General Harris has positioned herself to either be the champion of consumers or the banking lobby. Commentators have either seen her as a progressive rising star or as another democratic hack.
Understanding how Harris thinks about politics matters as it kinda clues one into what she is likely to do next (or not do).
In Matt Stoller's article he comments:
.
"Harris’s decision-making seems to be driven by personal connections and fundraising networks. This is not at all unusual, but it does contrast a bit with other types of public servants, who often see their job as serving the law itself. So what do her personal connections and fundraising networks look like?
.
Well, largely she shares them with President Obama, who endorsed her late in 2010 for the AG office. Her brother-in-law, Tony West, was key fundraiser for Obama in California, having helped raise $65 million for Obama in the state, and he is considered a rising star in the Democratic Party. He now works at the DOJ and has expanded the Civil Rights department to take on some elements of mortgage fraud. The DOJ has an internal directive to make mortgage fraud a top priority, but what mortgage fraud means to the DOJ are mortgage modification scams and penny ante borrowers ripping off fly-by-night lenders. West, while not the direct actor in the DOJ’s settlement talks, is in all likelihood involved in pressure on state AGs to sign on to a settlement. And it’s simply inconceivable he hasn’t dealt with his sister-in-law and political ally on the matter. Harris and West are part of a coherent political network, and much of the strength of that network has to do with reinforcing the traditional bank-friendly policies of the Democratic elite and then using that to create political support.
.
The first indication that as California AG Harris was more sympathetic to the Obama side of the ledger on banking is that one of her first decisions as AG was to let off Angelo Mozilo without admitting to wrong-doing or personally paying a fine (the small money that went to restitution came from Bank of America shareholders). I suspect the issue is actually more personal to her than legal, not because she particularly cares about finance or foreclosures, but because her friends and allies are very concerned about ensuring that the banks get a release. In their view, this will cause the housing market to clear, the economy to recover, and then help reelection chances".
.
While General Harris' supporters point out that she backed out of an immediate settlement a few weeks ago with the banks that screwed millions of Californians, she refused to join the joint investigation by Eric Schneiderman and Beau Biden on the foreclosure fraud crisis. The question has to be WHY?
.
Is she afraid of sharing visibility on the subject? Is she worried she will look inadequate in leading her budget ravaged staff that historically is more pro-institution than pro-consumer? Or is she just on the sidelines, trying to figure out what to do? Or is she more closely aligned to the very banking execs she should be joining in the investigation of [For example, she let the mortgage mauraders at Countrywide and its CEO Angelo Mozilo off the hook in February of 2011 when he paid a mere $6.5 million to get out of a predatory lending lawsuit filed by the state of California].
.
What is clear is that Kamala Harris is no progressive lie New York's AJ Eric Schneiderman.
.
The Kamala Harris history?
.
Harris got her start in big time San Francisco politics she was best known as the ex-girlfriend of former long-time Speaker of the California Assembly Willie Brown, who remains a powerful figure in California politics. Harris dumped Brown shortly after he became mayor but he provided key help to her campaign for District Attorney in 2003. It was a tough race against a two-term incumbent. In that race she agreed to participate in a system that mandated campaign finance limits. In the last days of the race when it was clear she had a shot at winning, she ignored the mandated spending limits she had previously agreed to assuming that the fines would be well worth the expense of spending extra money in the home stretch if she won. And she did win. Her career as San Francisco’s District Attorney was marred by allegations of massive mismanagement of the city’s crime lab which was under her jurisdiction. As a result, allegedly hundreds of criminal cases had to be thrown out of court.
.
Maybe General Harris could learn from a very tough AG in hard hit Nevada, Catherine Cortez Masto.
.
Window dressing politics have to stop. Harris needs to decide if she wants to be a warrior for victims or an apologist for the banking smucks that are still raking us over the coals.
Thursday, November 3, 2011
Prosecutorial Abuse in Closing Argument Case of Interest...
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has issued an Opinion in the matter of UNITED STATES of America v. Arturo SANCHEZ, Jr., Appellant, 2011 WL 5149141, No. 10–50192 (Nov. 1, 2011).
The Appellant Arturo Sanchez was appealing his convictions for importation and possession of cocaine. He asserted that the last statement made by the prosecution in its closing rebuttal argument rendered the trial unfair. The Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor's inflammatory remarks delivered at the end of his closing rebuttal argument were improper and prejudicial and reversed Sanchez's convictions.
On May 26, 2008, Sanchez entered the United States from Mexico at the Calexico, California port of entry driving a 2002 Passat. A narcotics detector dog alerted to the rear side of the vehicle. A search revealed hidden compartments containing 29 kilograms, or 64 pounds, of cocaine.
An Immigration and Customs Enforcement special agent then interviewed Sanchez. Sanchez told the special agent that he knew that drugs were hidden in his vehicle, but that he was afraid of the people who gave him the drugs to transport, and that they knew where he lived in Mexico. At trial, Sanchez took the stand and testified that, although he knew he was driving a vehicle containing drugs, he had done so under duress because the drug traffickers had threatened his family.
The prosecutor delivered his closing argument, followed by the defense counsel's closing argument. The prosecutor then commenced his rebuttal with remarks about the law of duress. At the end of his rebuttal, the prosecutor stated that the defense counsel was asking the jury to believe Sanchez's duress claim even though Sanchez had said nothing about fearing for his family's safety to the customs officers. The prosecutor then said: " Why don't we send a memo to all drug traffickers, to all persons south of the border and in Imperial County and in California—why not our nation while we're at it. Send a memo to them and say dear drug traffickers, when you hire someone to drive a load, tell them that they were forced to do it. Because even if they don't say it at primary and secondary, they'll get away with it if they just say their family was threatened. Because they don't trust Mexican police, and they don't think that the U.S. authorities can help them. Why don't we do that?"
Sanchez contended that the “send a memo” statement made by the prosecutor during his closing rebuttal was improper argument. However, Sanchez did not raise this objection before the district court and thus the court reviewed for plain error. Under the plain error standard, the court could only reverse Sanchez's conviction if the “send a memo” statement was improper and substantially prejudiced the defendant's trial. Even if both prongs of the test are met, the plain error doctrine authorizes the Courts of Appeals to correct only particularly egregious errors that seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985).
The Court stated that prosecutors may not urge jurors to convict a criminal defendant in order to protect community values, preserve civil order, or deter future lawbreaking. The evil lurking in such prosecutorial appeals is that the defendant will be convicted for reasons wholly irrelevant to his own guilt or innocence. Similarly, prosecutors may not point to a particular crisis in society and ask the jury to make a statement with their verdict. Nor can prosecutors comment on the potential social ramifications of the jury's reaching a verdict. Further, it is improper to make statements designed to appeal to the passions, fears and vulnerabilities of the jury.
The prosecutor's “send a memo” statement urged the jury to convict for reasons wholly irrelevant to Sanchez's guilt or innocence. The point of the “send a memo” statement was that if the jury acquitted Sanchez based on his duress defense, the verdict would in effect send a message to other drug couriers to use that defense themselves. By his “send a memo” statement, the prosecutor was encouraging the jury to come to a verdict based not on Sanchez's guilt or innocence, but on the “potential social ramifications” of the verdict, and this was improper argument.
Under the plain error standard, reversal is appropriate only if the prosecutor's improper conduct so affected the jury's ability to consider the totality of the evidence fairly that it tainted the verdict and deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The Court noted that there was no curative instruction given to mitigate the prejudice of the “send a memo” statement. Even so, curative instructions fail to neutralize the harm of improper statements by a prosecutor when they do not mention the specific statements of the prosecutor and are not given immediately after the damage is done.
Here, before closing arguments, the district court gave an instruction that arguments, statements, questions, and objections by lawyers are not evidence. Then, immediately before the prosecutor's “send a memo” statement, the district court reminded the jury to follow the jury instruction on the legal requirements of duress, and not to consider the lawyers' statements as evidence. However, advising a jury that lawyers' statement are not evidence is not equivalent to advising it to consider only the facts of the immediate case, rather than the possible societal consequences of its ruling. Moreover, once the “send a memo” statement was made, the district court did not address that specific statement, and gave no curative instruction. A generalized jury instruction that the statements of counsel were not evidence was not sufficient to dispel the level and type of prejudice generated by the prosecutor in this case. Thus, the district court failed to neutralize the harm caused by the prosecutor's “send a memo” statement. Even in the absence of objections by defense counsel, the trial judge must be alert to deviations from proper argument and take prompt corrective action as appropriate.
Blogger Bob's comment: Let's see what the SCOTUS does with this! It makes sense to shift the burden in such cases to the court when the prosecutor steps over the line in closing argument but with that said, could the inaction be explained by so many of the bench officers being former prosecutors?
The Appellant Arturo Sanchez was appealing his convictions for importation and possession of cocaine. He asserted that the last statement made by the prosecution in its closing rebuttal argument rendered the trial unfair. The Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor's inflammatory remarks delivered at the end of his closing rebuttal argument were improper and prejudicial and reversed Sanchez's convictions.
On May 26, 2008, Sanchez entered the United States from Mexico at the Calexico, California port of entry driving a 2002 Passat. A narcotics detector dog alerted to the rear side of the vehicle. A search revealed hidden compartments containing 29 kilograms, or 64 pounds, of cocaine.
An Immigration and Customs Enforcement special agent then interviewed Sanchez. Sanchez told the special agent that he knew that drugs were hidden in his vehicle, but that he was afraid of the people who gave him the drugs to transport, and that they knew where he lived in Mexico. At trial, Sanchez took the stand and testified that, although he knew he was driving a vehicle containing drugs, he had done so under duress because the drug traffickers had threatened his family.
The prosecutor delivered his closing argument, followed by the defense counsel's closing argument. The prosecutor then commenced his rebuttal with remarks about the law of duress. At the end of his rebuttal, the prosecutor stated that the defense counsel was asking the jury to believe Sanchez's duress claim even though Sanchez had said nothing about fearing for his family's safety to the customs officers. The prosecutor then said: " Why don't we send a memo to all drug traffickers, to all persons south of the border and in Imperial County and in California—why not our nation while we're at it. Send a memo to them and say dear drug traffickers, when you hire someone to drive a load, tell them that they were forced to do it. Because even if they don't say it at primary and secondary, they'll get away with it if they just say their family was threatened. Because they don't trust Mexican police, and they don't think that the U.S. authorities can help them. Why don't we do that?"
Sanchez contended that the “send a memo” statement made by the prosecutor during his closing rebuttal was improper argument. However, Sanchez did not raise this objection before the district court and thus the court reviewed for plain error. Under the plain error standard, the court could only reverse Sanchez's conviction if the “send a memo” statement was improper and substantially prejudiced the defendant's trial. Even if both prongs of the test are met, the plain error doctrine authorizes the Courts of Appeals to correct only particularly egregious errors that seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985).
The Court stated that prosecutors may not urge jurors to convict a criminal defendant in order to protect community values, preserve civil order, or deter future lawbreaking. The evil lurking in such prosecutorial appeals is that the defendant will be convicted for reasons wholly irrelevant to his own guilt or innocence. Similarly, prosecutors may not point to a particular crisis in society and ask the jury to make a statement with their verdict. Nor can prosecutors comment on the potential social ramifications of the jury's reaching a verdict. Further, it is improper to make statements designed to appeal to the passions, fears and vulnerabilities of the jury.
The prosecutor's “send a memo” statement urged the jury to convict for reasons wholly irrelevant to Sanchez's guilt or innocence. The point of the “send a memo” statement was that if the jury acquitted Sanchez based on his duress defense, the verdict would in effect send a message to other drug couriers to use that defense themselves. By his “send a memo” statement, the prosecutor was encouraging the jury to come to a verdict based not on Sanchez's guilt or innocence, but on the “potential social ramifications” of the verdict, and this was improper argument.
Under the plain error standard, reversal is appropriate only if the prosecutor's improper conduct so affected the jury's ability to consider the totality of the evidence fairly that it tainted the verdict and deprived the defendant of a fair trial. The Court noted that there was no curative instruction given to mitigate the prejudice of the “send a memo” statement. Even so, curative instructions fail to neutralize the harm of improper statements by a prosecutor when they do not mention the specific statements of the prosecutor and are not given immediately after the damage is done.
Here, before closing arguments, the district court gave an instruction that arguments, statements, questions, and objections by lawyers are not evidence. Then, immediately before the prosecutor's “send a memo” statement, the district court reminded the jury to follow the jury instruction on the legal requirements of duress, and not to consider the lawyers' statements as evidence. However, advising a jury that lawyers' statement are not evidence is not equivalent to advising it to consider only the facts of the immediate case, rather than the possible societal consequences of its ruling. Moreover, once the “send a memo” statement was made, the district court did not address that specific statement, and gave no curative instruction. A generalized jury instruction that the statements of counsel were not evidence was not sufficient to dispel the level and type of prejudice generated by the prosecutor in this case. Thus, the district court failed to neutralize the harm caused by the prosecutor's “send a memo” statement. Even in the absence of objections by defense counsel, the trial judge must be alert to deviations from proper argument and take prompt corrective action as appropriate.
Blogger Bob's comment: Let's see what the SCOTUS does with this! It makes sense to shift the burden in such cases to the court when the prosecutor steps over the line in closing argument but with that said, could the inaction be explained by so many of the bench officers being former prosecutors?
Wednesday, November 2, 2011
NEW FEDERAL SENTENCING COMMISSION REPORT
A copy of the new Federal Sentencing Commission Report on "mandatory minimums" is available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202520988995
Monday, October 31, 2011
STRIP SEARCH CASE (FLORENCE v BOARD of CHOSE FREEHOLDERS)
In Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, the 4th Amendment propriety of 2 strip searches of Albert Florence, a New Jersey resident is being reviewed by SCOTUS. Florence, after a traffic stop, was arrested on a bench warrant for failure to pay a fine even through Florence produced a receipt showing payment of the fine.
.
At intake, Florence was told to strip, open his mouth, lift his tongue and his genitals and to shower. He remained in jail for six days until being transferred to the Essex County jail where he underwent a more extensive strip search that included being ordered to squat and cough and then to shower. One day later, he was released when the charge was dismissed.
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Florence sued both counties and various officials, charging that their strip search procedures violated the 4th Amendment protection against unreasonable searches. After a federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Florence, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3d Circuit reversed saying prison officials should be accorded "wide-ranging deference" in enforcing policies necessary to maintain security and order in their prisons.
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During arguments, the justices peppered Goldstein, representing Florence, with questions about where and when reasonable suspicion is required and seemed at times confused and dissatisfied with his answers. "What is the greater intrusion — standing two or five feet away" from the naked arrestee when inspecting him or her, asked Justice Sonia Sotomayor. "That is a line that doesn't make much sense to me."
.
Goldstein explained that a prison officer might conduct a visual inspection from a distance of 10 feet. In that scenario, a naked arrestee showering and applying medication for lice does not require reasonable suspicion. His only concern, said Goldstein, is "the very close inspection of the individual's genitals, which can occur absolutely so long as there is some minimal level of suspicion that's created."
.
Phillips argued totold the justices that no reasonable suspicion is required even for intrusive body cavity searches. "That's the rule of law," he insisted, adding also that it did not matter whether the arrestee was being admitted into the general prison population because the risks "remain too substantial."
.
"Suppose someone is just arrested because they have a lot of tickets for being caught on speed cameras, let's say," suggested Justice Samuel Alito Jr. "That person can be subjected to the searches that you are describing?"
Phillips replied, "Yes, Justice Alito. I think the basic principle we are asking for is that deference to the jails and — and to the administrators of the jails. (It) requires that this Court respect their judgment that you can't make a distinction based on that specific individual; that whether somebody is a minor offender or a major offender: One, is never all that clear in the first place; and two, isn't a basis on which to distinguish the risks that it poses."
Justice Stephen Breyer was particularly skeptical that minor offenders posed a contraband problem based on some studies, and Justice Anthony Kennedy called the evidence "skimpy."
.
Saharsky said the question before the Court is whether there are reasons for a blanket rule — strip searches of all arrestees — to which the Court should defer. "First of all, you cannot say that there are some minor offenders that don't pose a contraband risk," she argued. "They are documented in the record. Second, you have individuals who are making very quick determinations. They have large numbers of people to get through into the general prison population. They have very little time, and if they guess wrong, those mistakes can be deadly."
.
If the rule is so important, why isn't it federal policy, asked Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Saharsky conceded that federal arrestees are given a choice of being strip searched and placed in the general prison population, or not being strip searched and placed in an alternative cell. "Who consents to that?" wondered Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. Saharsky said computers and other privileges are available to the general population.
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In an unusual comment directed at the Office of Solicitor General, Justice Ginsburg called the government's brief in the case "really confusing." Saharsky apologized.
.
Blogger Bob's comment: It is an interesting case that shows a thought process maybe consistent with the notion the 4th amendment is not DOA in these times.
.
At intake, Florence was told to strip, open his mouth, lift his tongue and his genitals and to shower. He remained in jail for six days until being transferred to the Essex County jail where he underwent a more extensive strip search that included being ordered to squat and cough and then to shower. One day later, he was released when the charge was dismissed.
.
Florence sued both counties and various officials, charging that their strip search procedures violated the 4th Amendment protection against unreasonable searches. After a federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Florence, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3d Circuit reversed saying prison officials should be accorded "wide-ranging deference" in enforcing policies necessary to maintain security and order in their prisons.
.
During arguments, the justices peppered Goldstein, representing Florence, with questions about where and when reasonable suspicion is required and seemed at times confused and dissatisfied with his answers. "What is the greater intrusion — standing two or five feet away" from the naked arrestee when inspecting him or her, asked Justice Sonia Sotomayor. "That is a line that doesn't make much sense to me."
.
Goldstein explained that a prison officer might conduct a visual inspection from a distance of 10 feet. In that scenario, a naked arrestee showering and applying medication for lice does not require reasonable suspicion. His only concern, said Goldstein, is "the very close inspection of the individual's genitals, which can occur absolutely so long as there is some minimal level of suspicion that's created."
.
Phillips argued totold the justices that no reasonable suspicion is required even for intrusive body cavity searches. "That's the rule of law," he insisted, adding also that it did not matter whether the arrestee was being admitted into the general prison population because the risks "remain too substantial."
.
"Suppose someone is just arrested because they have a lot of tickets for being caught on speed cameras, let's say," suggested Justice Samuel Alito Jr. "That person can be subjected to the searches that you are describing?"
Phillips replied, "Yes, Justice Alito. I think the basic principle we are asking for is that deference to the jails and — and to the administrators of the jails. (It) requires that this Court respect their judgment that you can't make a distinction based on that specific individual; that whether somebody is a minor offender or a major offender: One, is never all that clear in the first place; and two, isn't a basis on which to distinguish the risks that it poses."
Justice Stephen Breyer was particularly skeptical that minor offenders posed a contraband problem based on some studies, and Justice Anthony Kennedy called the evidence "skimpy."
.
Saharsky said the question before the Court is whether there are reasons for a blanket rule — strip searches of all arrestees — to which the Court should defer. "First of all, you cannot say that there are some minor offenders that don't pose a contraband risk," she argued. "They are documented in the record. Second, you have individuals who are making very quick determinations. They have large numbers of people to get through into the general prison population. They have very little time, and if they guess wrong, those mistakes can be deadly."
.
If the rule is so important, why isn't it federal policy, asked Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Saharsky conceded that federal arrestees are given a choice of being strip searched and placed in the general prison population, or not being strip searched and placed in an alternative cell. "Who consents to that?" wondered Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. Saharsky said computers and other privileges are available to the general population.
.
In an unusual comment directed at the Office of Solicitor General, Justice Ginsburg called the government's brief in the case "really confusing." Saharsky apologized.
.
Blogger Bob's comment: It is an interesting case that shows a thought process maybe consistent with the notion the 4th amendment is not DOA in these times.
Tuesday, October 25, 2011
DISTRICT ATTORNEY MIKE RAMOS WANTS MORE MONEY, EVEN IF IT SHUTS DOWN MORE COURTS?
In a whirlwind PR tour focusing not on conviction rates for major crimes but years of total sentences meted out, Mike Ramos admits he is actively lobbying the Governor's office (ya know the Democratic candidate who attended Ramos' fundraiser when there was a democratic challenger) for more permanent funding for the monitoring of the early releasees from state prison (caused by various court orders); the sad part of all this is that the Courts which Ramos' staff fills with cases, is operating on reserves--they ran out of budgeted money some time back!! Mike Ramos' lobbying (for permanent funding of the handling of the early, court-mandated state prison releasees) could drain court funding, forcing more courtroom closures and or staff reductions. Ramos remark? "They should have people present in funding discussions" (like they would know when Ramos is calling the Governor's staff). The empire building of Mike Ramos, even if it cripples the Court system which exists for everyone, is something that has to be watched. Maybe its time to look at prosecution decisions? If 90% of the alleged domestic violence victims want the charges against the significant other dropped as was recently reported in the local papers, is that part of the culture of abuse and victim response, or maybe could some of it be cases that could be deferred to civil harassment and restraining order (and injunction) remedies [See California Code of Civil Procedure Section 527.6, 527.8 & Welfare & Institutions Code Sec 15657.03], for which there is a ready remedy, can be handled using Judicial Council forms [CH-100 & a fee waiver] and court trained staff to already handle [and if there are violations of the injunctions, automatic incarceration].
WHY BRAD MITZELFELT HAS NO BUSINESS BEING A SUPERVISOR FOR the 1st DISTRICT of SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
"On October 12th, 2011, 16-year-old Armando Ramirez was cleaning out a tunnel at Community Recycling and Resource Recovery, Inc., a large scale waste facility in Lamont, California when he collapsed, suddenly overcome by hydrogen sulfide. Hydrogen sulfide is a toxic gas that attacks the central nervous system and is produced when facilities improperly compost organic waste. Armando's 22-year-old brother, Eladio attempted to rescue Armando but was overcome by the fumes himself.
Armando died before he reached the hospital. Eladio was pronounced brain-dead and died two days later after being removed from life support. Family members reported that the brothers were not provided with any safety protection other than a flimsy painter's mask and rubber boots.
Since opening in 1993, Community Resource and Recycling has repeatedly been fined and cited for violating local and state regulations. Local residents and state politicians are now asking the County to close the facility.
Please join us in protecting this community and sign the petition on Change.org
http://www.change.org/petitions/kern-..."
Blogger Bob's comments: You say so what? Well, this very type of facility was approved by the County of San Bernardino for construction in the High Desert, by a company with a history of complaints in its Adelanto operation (which was shut down). The project would be illegal if it were built in the South Coast Air Quality Management District, which four of the other County Supervisorial Districts are principally covered by, so what does Brad the Toad do, he finds a place in the High Desert for one of his and his former boss' (Postmus) contributors.
Armando died before he reached the hospital. Eladio was pronounced brain-dead and died two days later after being removed from life support. Family members reported that the brothers were not provided with any safety protection other than a flimsy painter's mask and rubber boots.
Since opening in 1993, Community Resource and Recycling has repeatedly been fined and cited for violating local and state regulations. Local residents and state politicians are now asking the County to close the facility.
Please join us in protecting this community and sign the petition on Change.org
http://www.change.org/petitions/kern-..."
Blogger Bob's comments: You say so what? Well, this very type of facility was approved by the County of San Bernardino for construction in the High Desert, by a company with a history of complaints in its Adelanto operation (which was shut down). The project would be illegal if it were built in the South Coast Air Quality Management District, which four of the other County Supervisorial Districts are principally covered by, so what does Brad the Toad do, he finds a place in the High Desert for one of his and his former boss' (Postmus) contributors.
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